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  In 1996, Congress created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court 
(ATRC). A court of deportation, the ATRC provides the U.S. 
attorney general a forum to remove expeditiously any resident alien 
who the attorney general has probable cause to believe is a terrorist. 
In theory, resident aliens receive different—and arguably far 
weaker—procedural protections before the ATRC than they would 
receive before an administrative immigration panel. In theory, the 
limited nature of the ATRC protections might implicate resident 
aliens’ Fifth Amendment rights. In practice, however, the ATRC has 
never been used. Perhaps to avoid an adverse constitutional ruling, 
the attorney general has never brought a deportation proceeding 
before the court. This Note examines the constitutionality of statutes 
underlying the ATRC that allow the government to rely on secret 
evidence. Although these provisions are constitutional on their face, 
they would be unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances. This 
Note concludes by suggesting how the ATRC’s secret-evidence 
provisions must be amended if the provisions are to become 
constitutional as applied in all circumstances. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Code provides for a court that is quite 
peculiar: the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC).1 The court’s 
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 1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2006). 
Although the statute does not refer to the Alien Terrorist Removal Court by this name, this 
name has been used widely by numerous authorities. E.g., David A. Martin, Graduated 
1834 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1833 
 
purpose is not neutral: it provides a forum for the U.S. attorney 
general to deport expeditiously any resident alien who the attorney 
general has probable cause to believe is a terrorist.2 Its procedures are 
secretive: proceedings must begin ex parte and in camera.3 During the 
war on terror, however, the ATRC has never been used despite its 
emphasis on deporting suspected terrorists.4 
Tension embroils the ATRC. The United States faces an ongoing 
threat of domestic terrorism,5 and one way to reduce that threat is to 
deport suspicious aliens.6 The U.S. Constitution, however, constrains 
how the government may act to deport a resident alien. Although the 
government may seek to deport any resident alien, in doing so its 
procedures must be fundamentally fair.7 For example, it must provide 
the alien adequate notice of deportation proceedings as well as an 
opportunity to be heard.8 When the government does not utilize the 
 
Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 134. 
 2. See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 708 (1998) (“The 
Act allows the government, at a resident alien deportation hearing, to present classified 
information in a summary report without revealing the classified evidence to the alien, while 
allowing the judge to examine all the evidence.”). Although Senate Democrats and Senate 
Republicans introduced competing bills to establish the ATRC’s procedures, they agreed on the 
court’s basic purpose. President Clinton, introducing the Democrats’ bill that later died, 
summarized this purpose as “[p]rovid[ing] a workable mechanism . . . to deport expeditiously 
alien terrorists without risking the disclosure of national security information or techniques.” 
141 CONG. REC. 4225 (1995) (statement of William J. Clinton, President of the United States). 
A “resident alien” is any person residing in the U.S. who is not an American citizen. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 79 (8th ed. 2004). 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). 
 4. Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1723 
(2007) (“[T]he 1996 alien terrorist removal system . . . has yet to be invoked.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Gail Gibson, War on Homegrown Terrorism Proceeding with Quiet Urgency, 
BALT. SUN, Apr. 17, 2005, at 1A (“Independent groups that monitor extremist activity inside 
the United States say that while the country has focused since 2001 on the threat from foreign 
terrorists, domestic operatives . . . have not gone away and, in some ways, are more dangerous 
than ever.”). Domestic terrorism refers to activities that “occur primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(c) (Supp. V 2005). 
 6. See Rachel L. Swarms, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims Could Be Deported, Officials 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A1 (“[D]eportations are a striking example of how the Bush 
Administration increasingly uses the nation’s immigration system as a weapon in the battle 
against terror.”). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 8. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36–37 (1982) (holding that a lawful, permanent 
resident alien seeking reentry to the United States is entitled to a hearing and remanding to 
determine whether eleven hours’ prior notice of the hearing was adequate). 
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ATRC, it addresses these constitutional strictures by conducting 
administrative hearings to determine deportation. At administrative 
hearings, the government must disclose its reasons for seeking 
deportation.9 This requirement can be burdensome for the 
government; in some situations, disclosing its reasons for seeking 
deportation might compromise national security.10 Requiring 
disclosure thus can place two national security goals squarely in 
conflict with each other. On the one hand, tolerating the alien’s 
continued presence within U.S. borders could compromise national 
security; on the other, disclosing the government’s reasons for seeking 
deportation could compromise national security.11 
Congress created the ATRC to sidestep this conflict.12 The 
ATRC’s statutory framework permits the U.S. attorney general to 
deport a suspicious resident alien without disclosing either the 
government’s confidential reasons for seeking deportation or any 
confidential evidence supporting those reasons, so long as the 
presiding judge finds that 
the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely 
cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death 
or serious bodily injury to any person, and the provision of the 
summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the 
national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.13 
 
 9. Id. But see D. Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminating a New Hardship of 
United States Immigration Policy, 19 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 42 n.83 (citing exceptions to this 
general principle). 
 10. See, e.g., Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1963 
(2005) (“Proponents of secret evidence argue . . . disclosure [of classified information] would 
jeopardize intelligence-gathering efforts in the field and dry up valuable sources of 
information. . . . Such a scenario is particularly dangerous if the accused is a member of a 
worldwide terrorist network, like al Qaeda.”). 
 11. As Professor Scaperlanda writes, 
Without the ability to use classified information as evidence in the deportation of 
terrorists, the executive branch is placed on the horns of a most difficult dilemma: it 
can disclose the evidence and deport, alienating [allies] in the process, 
compromising . . . agents in the field, and possibly compromising . . . intelligence 
techniques, or it can refuse to disclose the evidence and knowingly harbor a terrorist. 
Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation Proceedings, 
7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (1996). 
 12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401, 110 
Stat. 1258 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2006)). 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
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In other words, whenever national security requires deportation and 
secrecy, ATRC procedures allow the government to meet both goals 
by permitting the use of secret evidence. 
Using secret evidence, however, implicates a resident alien’s 
Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process.14 Because the 
evidence is undisclosed, the alien cannot examine it or test its 
accuracy. Also, to the extent the information’s source is secret, the 
alien cannot confront that source.15 The alien might not even learn the 
nature of the evidence underlying the prosecution; the alien might not 
know what to defend against or how to do it.16 Because of these 
concerns, several commentators have argued that the ATRC’s secret-
evidence provisions are unconstitutional.17 Perhaps out of fear about 
 
 14. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew 
v. Corning, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 
542 (1950); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 1995), 
vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409 
(D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 
2001); Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13, 18 (D.D.C. 1992) (mem.). 
 15. Even though the ATRC’s allowance of secret evidence restricts an alien’s ability to 
confront adverse evidence, the ATRC does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront one’s accuser because ATRC proceedings are immigration rather than criminal 
proceedings. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 115 (“[Legal permanent residents] are not given 
the full array of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the removal proceeding itself, but they 
[do] have such protections in the underlying criminal prosecution.”); cf. Note, supra note 10, at 
1973 (“Indeed, the extent to which the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and the 
Constitution’s due process protections more generally, apply to military commission trials is a 
hotly contested question.”). 
 16. During the Senate’s floor debate on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act, Senator Biden presented a colorful hypothetical to illustrate this concern: 
In the administration’s bill, the Government could, in some circumstances, use secret 
information, not disclosed to the defendant, not disclosed to the defendant’s lawyers, 
in order to make a case.  
. . . . [T]he prosecutor [could] meet alone with the judge and say: 
“Judge, these are all the horrible things that the defendant did. We’re not going to tell 
the defendant what evidence there is that he did these horrible things. We’re not 
going to let the defendant know what that evidence is. We’re not going to let the 
defendant’s lawyer know what it is. We’re not going to let the defendant’s lawyer 
answer these questions. You and me judge”—me, the prosecutor; you, the judge—
“let’s deport him in a secret hearing, using secret evidence. Let’s walk out of this 
courtroom, out of your chambers, walk out and say, ‘OK, Smedlap, you’re deported. 
We find you’re a terrorist. You’re out of here.’” 
And Smedlap looks and says, “Hey, tell me who said I was a terrorist. How do you 
know that?” We say, “Oh, no, we can’t tell you. We know you did it, and we can’t tell 
you how we know.” 
141 CONG. REC. 14531 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 17. See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties 
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 331–35 (1996) (arguing 
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the ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has never used the 
court.18 The constitutionality of its secret-evidence provisions has 
never been tested.19 Because of the court’s potential utility as a forum 
to safeguard the nation’s security from domestic terrorist acts, striking 
a constitutional balance is critical. 
This Note examines the constitutionality of the ATRC’s secret-
evidence provisions. Part I outlines the ATRC’s statutory framework. 
It examines the court’s secret-evidence provisions and places them 
within the context of the court’s procedures more generally. Part II 
shifts attention to case law, exploring how courts have defined the 
scope of resident aliens’ Fifth Amendment right to prevent the 
government from using secret evidence against them in immigration 
proceedings. In light of this case law, Part II examines how past 
commentators have assessed the ATRC’s constitutionality. Part III 
reassesses the constitutionality of the ATRC’s secret-evidence 
provisions. Although the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are 
constitutional on their face, Part III argues that they would fail an as-
applied challenge by a lawful, permanent resident alien who lacked 
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse evidence either directly or 
constructively through a specially appointed attorney. If the ATRC is 
to pass constitutional muster as applied in all circumstances, its 
statutory framework must be amended in two ways. First, Congress 
must strengthen the ATRC procedural protections to provide 
unlawful resident aliens and legal, temporary aliens with the same 
level of protection that the ATRC provides to permanent resident 
aliens.20 Second, the ATRC procedures must provide all resident 
aliens with the option to have a special attorney review the 
government’s secret evidence on the aliens’ behalf. 
 
that the ATRC’s statutory framework is unconstitutional); Beall, supra note 2, at 708 (same); 
Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Comment, Due Process or “Summary” Justice?: The Alien Terrorist 
Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 TULSA 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143, 166–67 (1996) (same). But see Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29–30 
(arguing that the ATRC’s statutory framework is constitutional). 
 18. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 856 (4th ed. 2007) (“It may be 
that constitutional doubts about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special court are 
why the government has never used it.”). 
 19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 20. This is so even though the distinction between a legal permanent resident, a legal 
temporary resident, and an illegal resident is constitutionally significant. For a more complete 
explanation of this distinction’s constitutional significance, see infra notes 60–62 and 
accompanying text. 
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I.  THE ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT’S  
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The ATRC came into being in 1996 when Congress passed the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.21 The congressional 
majority that created the ATRC intended this court to protect against 
domestic acts of terrorism without unduly interfering with resident 
aliens’ constitutional rights.22 To assess whether Congress succeeded, 
it is important to become familiar with the statutory provisions 
underlying the ATRC. This Part introduces three categories of these 
statutory provisions: those providing for the court’s jurisdiction and 
composition of judges, those providing for the court’s prehearing 
procedures, and those providing for the procedures at ATRC 
hearings. 
A. Jurisdiction and Composition 
By statute, the ATRC possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate 
deportation proceedings “[i]n any case in which the Attorney General 
has classified information that an alien is an alien terrorist.”23 
Although it is an Article I court, Article III judges govern it—five 
U.S. District Court judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.24 Each judge serves for five years, and no two judges 
may come from the same judicial circuit.25 
B. Prehearing Procedures 
ATRC cases begin in secret. The U.S. attorney general submits 
an ex parte, in camera application identifying the resident alien whom 
the attorney general seeks to deport.26 A single ATRC judge reviews 
the attorney general’s application.27 In addition to the application, the 
judge may consider any “other information, including classified 
 
 21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1258 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537 (2006)). 
 22. See 141 CONG. REC. 14524 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Each of the provisions in 
the [Alien Terrorist Removal Act, Title IV of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996,] strikes a careful balance between necessary vigilance against a terrorist threat and 
the preservation of our cherished freedom.”). 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). 
 24. Id. § 1532(a). 
 25. Id. § 1532(a)–(b). 
 26. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(C). 
 27. Id. § 1533(c)(1). 
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information, presented under oath or affirmation; and testimony 
received in any hearing on the application.”28 The judge must grant 
the attorney general’s application on a finding of probable cause to 
believe that “the alien who is the subject of the application has been 
correctly identified and is an alien terrorist present in the United 
States; and removal [via administrative proceeding] would pose a risk 
to the national security of the United States.”29 None of the 
information that the judge considers in granting the attorney 
general’s application has evidentiary value unless the attorney general 
presents the same evidence at the removal hearing.30 
C. Removal Hearing Procedures 
If the attorney general’s application for an ATRC removal 
hearing is approved, the alien who is the subject of the hearing must 
receive reasonable notice of “the nature of the charges against [him], 
including a general account of the basis for the charges; and the time 
and place at which the hearing will be held.”31 The hearing must be 
open to the public,32 and the individual has a right to be present at the 
removal hearing and a right to counsel.33 If the alien cannot afford 
counsel, the ATRC judge must appoint an attorney.34 
The removal hearing begins with the government’s case-in-
chief.35 The government enjoys relatively free reign regarding the 
evidence it may present against the resident alien: the Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not apply,36 and the alien may not seek to suppress 
evidence as being unlawfully obtained.37 Also, the government may 
present in camera and ex parte any evidence for which the attorney 
 
 28. Id. § 1533(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
 29. Id. § 1533(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
 30. See id. § 1534(c)(5) (“The decision of the judge regarding removal shall be based only 
on that evidence introduced at the removal hearing.”). 
 31. Id. § 1534(b)(1)–(2). 
 32. Id. § 1534(a)(2). 
 33. Id. § 1534(c)(1). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. § 1534(f). 
 36. Id. § 1534(h). 
 37. Id. § 1534(e)(1)(B). Jennifer Beall writes that the ATRC is unconstitutional because it 
allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be considered, and she implies that the ATRC’s 
framework should be amended to foreclose such evidence. Beall, supra note 2, at 706–08. A full 
discussion of this issue requires more space than is available for this Note. This Note’s scope is 
limited to assessing whether the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are constitutional. 
1840 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1833 
 
general unilaterally “determines that public disclosure would pose a 
risk to the national security of the United States or to the security of 
any individual.”38 When the government presents evidence in secret, 
the source of the information remains secret as well.39 
For secret evidence to be admissible, in most situations the 
government must provide the ATRC with an unclassified summary of 
the evidence.40 Such a summary must be “sufficient to enable the alien 
to prepare a defense.”41 In some situations, however, the ATRC judge 
may allow the government to enter secret evidence even without 
providing a summary.42 Specifically, the government may admit secret 
evidence without providing a summary if the ATRC judge finds that 
the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely 
cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death 
or serious bodily injury to any person, and the provision of the 
summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the 
national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.43  
Although the alien may not personally examine any of the 
government’s secret evidence, the alien still may challenge such 
evidence. If the alien has received an unclassified summary of the 
secret evidence, the alien may challenge the evidence through this 
unclassified summary. If the alien has not received an unclassified 
summary but is lawfully admitted for permanent U.S. residence, the 
court must appoint the alien a special attorney who possesses a 
security clearance affording the attorney access to classified 
information.44 The lawful, permanent resident alien may then examine 
and challenge the veracity of the evidence constructively through the 
specially appointed attorney.45 If the alien is not lawfully admitted for 
permanent U.S. residence, however, a special attorney is not 
available. The illegal or temporary alien’s only option for challenging 
secret evidence is to use an unclassified summary of the evidence, if 
 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A), (f). 
 39. See id. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (“[N]either the alien nor the public shall be informed of such 
evidence or its sources . . . .”). 
 40. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B). 
 41. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C). 
 42. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(ii). 
 43. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
 44. Id. § 1532(e)(1). 
 45. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(i), (e)(3)(F)(i). 
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such a summary is available.46 Any alien may cross-examine nonsecret 
evidence and nonsecret witnesses.47 
After the government presents its case-in-chief, the alien may 
introduce evidence to defend against the charges.48 The government 
then has an opportunity to close the hearing by replying in rebuttal.49 
Ultimately, the government must carry a “burden to prove, by the 
preponderance of the evidence, that the alien is subject to removal 
because the alien is an alien terrorist.”50 If the government carries this 
burden, the alien is deportable.51 Normal methods of discretionary 
relief from deportation, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or 
registry, are not available.52 Either party, however, may appeal.53 
The court’s framework contains several procedural safeguards 
for resident aliens who come before it. The court’s arbiters are Article 
III judges; its hearings are open to the public; resident aliens have the 
right to attend their own hearings, the right to counsel, and the right 
to cross-examine nonsecret evidence; and if the resident aliens are 
lawfully admitted for permanent U.S. residence, the aliens have the 
right either to review secret evidence constructively through specially 
appointed counsel or to receive an unclassified summary of the secret 
evidence.54 
Nevertheless, the ATRC lacks several procedural safeguards. 
ATRC proceedings begin against resident aliens before the aliens are 
aware of the charges. At ATRC hearings, the government may enter 
secret evidence against resident aliens that the aliens may not 
personally review. In some situations, temporary or unlawful resident 
aliens might not even receive an unclassified summary of that secret 
 
 46. See id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(i) (“[I]f the alien involved is an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, the procedures described in subparagraph (F) [for constructively reviewing 
secret evidence] shall apply.” (emphasis added)). 
 47. Id. § 1534(c)(2)–(3). 
 48. Id. § 1534(f). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 1534(g). 
 51. Even if an alien is ruled deportable, actual deportation is not automatic. The U.S. 
government may retain custody of the alien until it finds another country that is willing to accept 
the alien. Id. § 1537(b). 
 52. See id. § 1534(k) (forbidding the judge to consider relief from removal based on 
asylum, withholding or cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, or 
registry). 
 53. Id. § 1535(c)(1). 
 54. A lawful, permanent resident alien also enjoys a right of automatic appeal upon denial 
of a written summary of classified information. Id. § 1535(c)(2). 
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evidence. These provisions implicate resident aliens’ Fifth 
Amendment rights to procedural due process and have prompted 
several commentators to argue that the ATRC is unconstitutional.55 
Throughout the ATRC’s statutory framework, Congress’s 
purpose for the court is evident: to provide a forum through which 
the U.S. attorney general may deport resident aliens who likely are 
terrorists without requiring the attorney general to sacrifice any state 
secrets in doing so. 
II.  ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 OF THE ATRC’S SECRET-EVIDENCE PROVISIONS 
As of this writing, no court has ever assessed whether the 
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions violate a resident alien’s right to 
procedural due process.56 At a more general level, no court has ever 
decided whether the government may use secret evidence before any 
tribunal to find a resident alien deportable. Several courts have, 
however, addressed secret evidence’s constitutionality in other 
immigration settings.57 Arguing by analogy, it is possible to assess the 
constitutionality of using secret evidence in deportation hearings 
before the ATRC.58 
A. Secret Evidence, Immigration, and Resident Aliens’ Due Process 
Rights 
At the outset, it is important to note that a resident alien enjoys 
the right to procedural due process. The Fifth Amendment protects 
every person within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether that 
person is a citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or a person “whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory.”59 The 
 
 55. See infra Part II.B. 
 56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra notes 63–117 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall 
any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Kwong 
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (“It is well established that if an alien is a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person 
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., 
concurring) (“[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested 
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders.”). 
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Fifth Amendment, however, does not protect every person to the 
same extent: 
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by 
the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that 
all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, 
indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single 
homogeneous legal classification. . . . [A] host of constitutional and 
statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction 
between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for 
one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a 
heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of 
ties to this country.60 
The strength of a resident alien’s procedural due process right is 
commensurate with the strength of the alien’s ties to the United 
States. As the U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated, “[m]ere lawful 
presence in the country . . . gives [the resident alien] certain rights; 
[those rights] become more extensive and secure when he makes 
preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they 
expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.”61 
A resident alien’s procedural due process rights are thus defined 
along a sliding scale, increasing in potency with the alien’s growing 
ties to the United States. An unlawful resident receives the least 
protection under the Fifth Amendment; a lawful, temporary resident 
receives more protection; and a lawful, permanent resident receives 
the most extensive protection. Within this rubric, several courts have 
assessed the constitutionality of using secret evidence against an alien 
in an immigration proceeding.62 In all, courts have assessed the 
constitutionality of secret evidence in five immigration contexts: 
excluding an alien from entering the United States for the first time, 
 
 60. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78–79; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The 
alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a 
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.”). 
 61. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770. 
 62. The ATRC is not the only apparatus that purports to allow the U.S. attorney general to 
use secret evidence against a noncitizen in an immigration proceeding. Federal regulation allows 
the attorney general to use secret evidence in a variety of immigration contexts. See 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.11(c)(3)(iv) (2007) (permitting the use of classified information in applications for asylum 
and withholding of removal in removal hearings); id. § 1240.33(c)(4) (permitting the use of 
classified evidence in applications for asylum and withholding of deportation in exclusion 
hearings); id. § 1240.11(a)(3) (permitting the use of classified information in adjustment of 
status reports); id. § 1003.19(d) (permitting the use of classified information in custody and bond 
determinations). 
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excluding a resident alien from returning to the United States after 
temporarily leaving, changing a resident alien’s legal status, 
determining whether to set bond or to detain a resident alien awaiting 
a deportation hearing, and determining whether to grant 
discretionary relief from deportation after an alien has been held 
deportable. This Part discusses courts’ treatment of each of these 
contexts in turn. 
1. Excluding an Alien from Entering the United States.  Aliens 
with few ties to the United States have experienced little success in 
challenging the use of secret evidence. A leading case is United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.63 In ex rel. Knauff, a German-born 
woman sought entry into the United States to become a naturalized 
citizen.64 She had served England’s Royal Air Force “efficiently and 
honorably” during World War II, had worked for the U.S. War 
Department in Germany after the war, and had married a naturalized 
U.S. citizen who had fought for the United States in World War II 
and received an honorable discharge from the Army.65 
When Knauff arrived at Ellis Island, these facts were not enough 
to secure her entry into the United States. Immigration and 
Naturalization officers detained her, and the U.S. attorney general 
“concluded upon the basis of confidential information that the public 
interest required [her to] be denied the privilege of entry into the 
United States.”66 The attorney general entered an order permanently 
excluding her from the country.67 He also denied her a hearing on the 
matter, finding that disclosure of the confidential information at such 
a hearing “would be prejudicial to the public interest.”68 
The controversy made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
upheld the attorney general’s actions and ruled that the use of secret 
evidence against Knauff was constitutional. As the Court reasoned, 
admission to the United States is a privilege rather than a right.69 
Because initial entry into the United States is a mere privilege, 
 
 63. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 64. Id. at 539. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 544. 
 67. Id. at 539–40. 
 68. Id. at 541. 
 69. Id. at 542. 
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“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”70 
Ms. Knauff’s case generated much publicity, and the INS 
eventually granted her a hearing despite the Court’s holding.71 There, 
“it was discovered that the confidential informant was her husband’s 
angry ex-girlfriend.”72 The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately 
held that there was insufficient evidence to support a decision to 
exclude Ms. Knauff from the United States.73 Yet Knauff remains 
good law: the attorney general may use secret evidence in 
determining whether to admit or to exclude a noncitizen who wishes 
to enter the United States for the first time.74 
2. Excluding a Resident Alien from Reentering the United States.  
In contrast to a noncitizen wishing to enter the United States for the 
first time, noncitizens who have entered the United States lawfully for 
permanent residence develop a right to reenter the country if they 
leave temporarily.75 At least one court has held that the government 
may not use secret evidence to exclude them. In Rafeedie v. INS,76 a 
lawful, permanent resident alien who had lived in the United States 
for fourteen years left the country for two weeks.77 On the basis of 
secret evidence, the U.S. attorney general sought to exclude him 
when he attempted to reenter the country.78 The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia struck down the use of secret evidence 
because of the man’s strong ties to the United States and the risk that 
using secret evidence would erroneously classify him as a risk to 
 
 70. Id. at 544. 
 71. Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 334; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and 
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 933, 963 (1995). 
 72. Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 334 (citing ELLEN KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF 
STORY (1952)). 
 73. Weisselberg, supra note 71, at 963–64. 
 74. See Note, supra note 10, at 1968 (“Although both Knauff and Mezei ‘became—and 
remain—causes célèbres highlighting the potential problems with using classified information,’ 
they nonetheless continue to carry significant weight with courts today.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Kelley Brooke Snyder, Note, A Clash of Values: Classified Information in Immigration 
Proceedings, 88 VA. L. REV. 447, 459 (2002))). 
 75. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to 
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional 
status changes accordingly.”). 
 76. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992) (mem.). 
 77. Id. at 16. 
 78. Id. at 16–17. 
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national security.79 In striking down the government’s use of secret 
evidence, the court applied the three-part balancing test for gauging 
whether governmental action satisfies procedural due process, which 
the U.S. Supreme Court developed in the 1976 case Mathews v. 
Eldridge80: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.81 
Under the Mathews test’s first prong, the court held that the 
lawful, permanent resident alien “has a substantial stake that could be 
affected by official action. ‘[T]he result, after all, may be to separate 
him from family, friends, property, and career, and to remit him to 
starting a new life in a new land.’”82 Under the test’s second prong, 
relying on secret evidence posed a risk of error “weigh[ing] heavily” 
against the government.83 Finally, under the test’s third prong, the 
government’s interest in using secret evidence—protecting national 
security—was significant but not all-encompassing.84 During the 
exclusion proceedings, the government had allowed Rafeedie to stay 
in the United States, even permitting him “to move from his home in 
Ohio to Texas.”85 According to the court, this action suggested the 
government had “at least implicitly determined that allowing plaintiff 
to remain free in the United States pending resolution of this 
litigation is in the public interest or, at the very least, not against the 
public interest.”86 In light of these facts, the court held that Rafeedie’s 
interest in remaining in the country coupled with the risk of error 
posed by using secret evidence outweighed the government’s interest 
 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This test has become standard for 
adjudicating procedural due process challenges. Courts and commentators commonly refer to 
the test as the Mathews test, and this Note will do the same. 
 81. Id. at 335. 
 82. Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 
506, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 83. Id. at 19. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. 
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in using secret evidence against him.87 The court struck down the 
government’s use of secret evidence.88 
3. Change-of-Status Determinations.  In American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. Reno,89 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the U.S. attorney general could 
use secret evidence against lawful, temporary resident aliens in a 
change-of-status determination.90 The INS had initiated deportation 
proceedings against eight resident aliens, alleging that they were 
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
“a world-wide Communist organization.”91 The aliens challenged the 
government’s basis for seeking to expel them, arguing that expelling 
them for allegedly belonging to a Communist organization violated 
the First Amendment.92 The attorney general subsequently dropped 
that basis for deportation but replaced it by alleging that the aliens 
belonged to an organization “involv[ed] in global terrorism.”93 The 
government also charged six of the individuals for being temporary 
residents who had overstayed their visas.94 This statement was true, 
and two of the aliens who had overstayed their visas applied to 
change their status to lawful, permanent residence.95 The government 
denied their request for a change in status on the basis of secret 
evidence.96 It justified its decision broadly, not naming any particular 
grounds for suspecting the two resident aliens of wrongdoing other 
than their alleged connection to the PFLP.97 
 
 87. Id. at 19–20. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated 
on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 90. Id. at 1052. Among its other purposes, a change-of-status proceeding determines 
whether a resident alien is considered an illegal resident, a legal temporary resident, or a legal 
permanent resident. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255–58 (2006) (detailing 
the ways in which the federal government may adjust or change a nonimmigrant’s status). 
 91. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Nomination of 
William H. Webster to Be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. 
of Intelligence, 100th Cong. 95 (1987) (statement of William Webster, Judge)). 
 92. Id. at 1052. 
 93. Id. at 1069. 
 94. Id. at 1053. 
 95. Id. at 1054. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1069. 
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Applying the Mathews test, the court considered the aliens’ 
interest at issue in the change-of-status determination, the 
government’s interest in using secret evidence at the hearing, and the 
risk of erroneous deprivation that secret evidence might cause.98 
Without commenting why, but perhaps because deportation 
proceedings against the individuals had begun, the court equated the 
aliens’ interest in changing their status to lawful, permanent residence 
with their right to remain in their homes.99 The court considered this 
interest to be great: “Aliens who have resided for more than a decade 
in this country, even those whose status is now unlawful because of 
technical visa violations, have a strong liberty interest in remaining in 
their homes.”100 
On the other hand, and crucial to the decision’s applicability in 
other circumstances, the government’s interest in using secret 
evidence was weak because 
the Government has offered no evidence to demonstrate that these 
particular aliens threaten the national security of this 
country. . . . [A]lthough it indicates that the PFLP advocates 
prohibited doctrines and that the aliens are members, it does not 
indicate that either alien has personally advocated those doctrines or 
has participated in terrorist activities.101 
Also, the court concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation was 
large: “There is no direct evidence in the record to show what 
percentage of decisions utilizing undisclosed classified information 
result in error; yet, as the district court below stated, ‘One would be 
hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in erroneous 
deprivations.’”102 The court invalidated the use of secret evidence, 
writing, “Because of the danger of injustice when decisions lack the 
procedural safeguards that form the core of constitutional due 
process, the Mathews balancing suggests that use of undisclosed 
information in adjudications should be presumptively 
unconstitutional. Only the most extraordinary circumstances could 
support one-sided process.”103 
 
 98. Id. at 1068–69. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1069–70 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 1069 (quoting Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365, 
1375 (C.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 103. Id. at 1070. 
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4. Bond Determinations.  In Kiareldeen v. Reno,104 the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey considered whether the 
government could use secret evidence in determining whether to 
detain or to release on bond a lawful, permanent resident alien 
awaiting deportation proceedings.105 Applying the Mathews test, the 
court struck down the use of secret evidence.106 As the court wrote, 
the individual’s interests “must be accorded the utmost weight. 
Kiareldeen has been removed from his community, his home, and his 
family, and has been denied rights that ‘[rank] high among the 
interests of the individual.’”107 It also stressed, “the risk of erroneous 
deprivation . . . militates in the petitioner’s favor. Use of secret 
evidence creates a one-sided process by which the protections of our 
adversarial system are rendered impotent.”108 The government argued 
that it satisfied the final Mathews factor because its desire to protect 
national security constituted a strong governmental interest in using 
secret evidence.109 As in Rafeedie, however, the government had 
engaged in actions that undercut its claim that the particular resident 
alien posed a serious threat. In the court’s words, “even the 
government does not find its own allegations sufficiently serious to 
commence criminal proceedings. The petitioner asserts, 
unchallenged, that the FBI recently closed its criminal investigation of 
[him], and does not intend to reopen the investigation unless it 
receives new information that he is involved in terrorist activity.”110 
Under these circumstances, the resident alien’s interest in remaining 
free and the interest against an erroneous bond determination 
outweighed the government’s interest in using secret evidence.111 
 
 104. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit highlighted the limited 
scope of its opinion: “We vigorously emphasize that the issue before us is solely the grant of 
attorneys’ fees and costs. We are not reviewing the merits of the decisions in the administrative 
proceedings or in the district court.” Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d at 547. 
 105. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 407–14 (examining the use of secret 
evidence). 
 106. Id. at 414. 
 107. Id. at 413 (alteration in original). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 414. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 413–14 (holding that “the petitioner’s private interest in his physical liberty[] 
must be accorded the utmost weight,” “the risk of erroneous deprivation[] also militates in the 
petitioner’s favor,” and “the government’s claimed interest in detaining the petitioner cannot be 
said to outweigh the petitioner’s interest in returning to freedom”). 
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5. Considering Discretionary Relief from Deportation.  In Jay v. 
Boyd,112 the U.S. Supreme Court held 5–4 that the government may 
use secret evidence to convince an administrative tribunal to refrain 
from using its discretion to suspend the deportation of an alien 
already found deportable.113 Explaining its decision, the Court agreed 
with the district court’s determination “that the U.S. attorney general 
may consider confidential information outside the record when 
deciding whether to grant discretionary relief from deportation.”114 
Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren sharply criticized the 
government’s reliance on secret evidence, even in an administrative 
hearing for mere discretionary relief: “Such a hearing is not an 
administrative hearing in the American sense of the term. It is no 
hearing.”115 Justice Black, also dissenting, elaborated on this view: 
What is meant by “confidential information”? According to officers 
of the Immigration Service it may be “merely information we 
received off the street”; or “what might be termed as hearsay 
evidence, which could not be gotten into the record” . . . . No nation 
can remain true to the ideal of liberty under law and at the same 
time permit people to have their homes destroyed and their lives 
blasted by the slurs of unseen and unsworn informers. There is no 
possible way to contest the truthfulness of anonymous accusations. 
The supposed accuser can neither be identified nor interrogated. He 
may be the most worthless and irresponsible character in the 
community. What he said may be wholly malicious, untrue, 
unreliable, or inaccurately reported. In a court of law the triers of 
fact could not even listen to such gossip, much less decide the most 
trifling issue on it.116 
Despite this objection, Jay v. Boyd remains good law.117 
In short, courts have assessed the constitutionality of using secret 
evidence in exclusion hearings, reentry proceedings, change-of-status 
determinations, bond determinations, and discretionary relief 
determinations. No court, however, has squarely addressed the 
 
 112. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). 
 113. Id. at 347, 361. 
 114. Id. at 347 (alteration in original). 
 115. Id. at 361–62 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 117. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410–11 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Jay v. 
Boyd remains good law but was decided on statutory interpretation grounds). 
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constitutionality of using secret evidence to rule a resident alien 
deportable. 
B. Assessing the ATRC’s Constitutionality by Analogy: Past 
Commentators’ Thoughts 
Several scholars have commented on the constitutionality of 
using secret evidence in a deportation hearing.118 Most have done so 
by applying the Mathews test, arguing by analogy from some or all of 
the five circumstances relating to immigration in which courts have 
assessed the constitutionality of secret evidence.119 Commentators 
applying this test have largely agreed with federal courts’ application 
of the three Mathews factors. First, a resident alien possesses an 
interest in remaining in the United States; this interest militates 
against allowing the use of evidence the alien cannot see or cross-
examine.120 Second, using secret evidence creates a risk of erroneously 
depriving the resident alien of this interest to remain in the United 
States.121 This risk also weighs against allowing the use of secret 
evidence before the ATRC.122 Third, and cutting in the other 
 
 118. See, e.g., Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 331–35 (arguing that the ATRC’s secret-
evidence provisions are unconstitutional); Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29–30 (arguing that the 
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are constitutional); Beall, supra note 2, at 694 (arguing that 
the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are unconstitutional); Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 
154–66 (same); Jim Rosenfeld, Note, Deportation Proceedings and the Due Process of Law, 26 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 742–49 (1995) (same); see also Melissa A. O’Loughlin, Note, 
Terrorism: The Problem and the Solution—The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 
1995, 22 J. LEGIS. 103, 120 (1996) (arguing that the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 
1995 “tramples the rights of law-abiding resident aliens” and “should not be adopted without 
substantial revisions,” but stopping short of declaring that the Act would be unconstitutional). 
In some circumstances, ATRC proceedings might also implicate a resident alien’s other 
constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom of association. Such circumstances are beyond 
the scope of this Note. For a helpful discussion of how the ATRC might implicate an alien’s 
First Amendment rights, see Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the Membership 
and Advocacy Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 623–24, 643–53 (1996). 
 119. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27–29; Beall, supra note 2, at 707–08; Harkenrider, supra 
note 17, at 155–65; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744–48. But see Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, 
at 331–35 (describing the ATRC as a “New Star Chamber” and arguing that its proceedings are 
unconstitutional without reference to Mathews). 
 120. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27, 29–30; Beall, supra note 2, at 707; Harkenrider, supra 
note 17, at 155–58; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744–45. 
 121. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27–29; Beall, supra note 2, at 707; Harkenrider, supra 
note 17, at 158–61, 163–64; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 745–46. 
 122. See Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (“The second factor (risk of error) is great, and the value 
of additional procedural safeguards is obvious.”); Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 158–61, 163–64 
(calling the lowered evidentiary standards the “most notorious features of the removal court 
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direction, the government possesses an interest in using secret 
evidence whenever disclosing the information would compromise 
national security.123 
The commentators also are relatively unified in how they would 
weigh each of the three Mathews factors. A resident alien’s interest in 
remaining in the United States is “great,”124 “weighty,”125 
“substantial,”126 or similarly defined.127 The risk of error from using 
secret evidence is “great,”128 “grave,”129 or similarly stated.130 The 
government’s interest in using secret evidence to protect national 
security is more complex. In the abstract, this interest is “strong,”131 
“weighs heavy,”132 or is “tremendously important.”133 In practice, 
 
provisions”); Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 746 (“[D]ue process history reveals the grave danger, 
during times like these, of instituting procedures which fail to adequately protect due process 
rights.”). But see Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28–29 (arguing that even though using secret 
evidence increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the ATRC’s other procedural 
protections might overcome that risk). 
 123. See, e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29 (“Without the ability to use classified 
information as evidence in the deportation of terrorists, the executive branch is placed on the 
horns of a most difficult dilemma . . . .”). 
 124. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27 (“Her problem may be compounded by the scarlet 
letter she has to bear. Having been adjudged a terrorist, she may be unable to gain admittance 
to any other country, forcing her to take a place . . . as an indefinite guest at a governmental 
detention facility.”). 
 125. Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)). 
 126. Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 156. 
 127. See Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744 (“If the banishment of an alien from a country 
into which he has been invited . . . where he may have formed the most tender of connections, 
where he may have vested his entire property and acquired property . . . and where he may have 
nearly completed his probationary title to citizenship . . . if a banishment of this sort be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to 
which the norms can be applied.” (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES MADISON, REPORT TO 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA (1800), reprinted in VA. COMM’N ON CONST’L GOV’T, 
THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON’S REPORT OF 1799, at 36 (1960)).  
 128. Beall, supra note 2, at 707. 
 129. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 746. 
 130. See Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28 (“[T]he risk of error is greater, maybe even much 
greater, when a person is denied access to the full raw evidence against him, leaving him 
incapable of testing the integrity of that evidence by cross-examination and rebuttal.”); 
Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 160 (“Even if it is accepted that the singular purpose of 
confrontation is to promote accuracy . . . the frail guarantee that the alien will be given a version 
of events prepared by his opponent which is merely ‘sufficient to prepare a defense’ does little 
to promote this process.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. Beall, supra note 2, at 708. 
 132. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29; see also Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 165 (“This 
government interest in secrecy should weigh heavily in the balance.”). 
 133. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 747. 
2008] ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT 1853 
 
however, “information does not always end up being as dangerous to 
national security as originally presented.”134 For this reason, given the 
“repeated, excessive deprivations of individual liberty that have been 
executed in the name of ‘national security,’ healthy skepticism is 
called for whenever this interest is invoked by legislators.”135 
Commentators’ analysis under the Mathews test also has differed 
in several regards. Professor Michael Scaperlanda and Jennifer Beall 
differ from other commentators in that they examine not only the 
procedural safeguards that the ATRC lacks, but also those that it 
adds compared to an administrative proceeding.136 Professor David 
Martin is the first commentator to differentiate among different 
classes of resident aliens based on the strength of their ties to the 
United States.137 He also is the first commentator to examine whether 
constructive review of secret evidence sufficiently protects the 
procedural due process rights of lawful, permanent resident aliens.138 
 
 134. Beall, supra note 2, at 708. 
 135. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 747; see also Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 164 
(“National security is a unique concern, perhaps the most imperative of federal government 
functions. . . . [T]he public view of this function often transmutes into a vital yet amorphous 
stake against a faceless enemy. Guided only by a xenophobic national angst, this preoccupation 
threatens the very nation it seeks to protect.”). 
 136. As Professor Scaperlanda explains, “[p]rocedural fairness derives from a flexible 
aggregate of safeguards, which cannot accurately be viewed in isolation from each other.” 
Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 33 n.62. Scaperlanda and Beall are not the first to argue from this 
perspective. In 1975, Judge Friendly gave a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School in which he argued that “the elements of a fair hearing should not be considered 
separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to 
one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or even eliminating another.” Henry J. 
Friendly, Lecture, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). Judge Friendly 
named eleven procedural rights that indicate due process. In decreasing importance, they are an 
individual’s rights to an unbiased tribunal, to notice of the proposed action and of the grounds 
asserted for it, to an opportunity to present reasons against the proposed action, to call 
witnesses, to know adverse evidence, to obtain a decision on the matter based solely on the 
evidence presented, to counsel, to the making of a record, to a statement of reasons underlying 
the tribunal’s decision, to public attendance of the hearing, and to judicial review. See id. at 
1279–95 (discussing each factor). 
 137. See Martin, supra note 1, at 82–83, 136–37 (concluding that the Court “should recognize 
that the line separating lawful permanent residents, domiciled with the clearest possible consent 
from the community, from other aliens temporarily or unlawfully present carriers greater 
significance” than the “exclusion-deportation line”).  
 138. See id. at 135–36. Professor Martin develops a five-category hierarchy of resident aliens, 
depending on the strength of their ties to the United States and on the circumstances in which 
the government seeks to deport them. See id. at 92–100 (describing a hierarchy of lawful 
permanent residents, admitted nonimmigrants, entrants without inspection, parolees, and 
applicants at the border). Noting that the ATRC has jurisdiction only over resident aliens—
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Professor Martin argues that constructive review is constitutionally 
insufficient: 
One can expect that [special attorneys] will be tough and 
demanding, but the requirement that they not divulge any of the 
classified information to their clients cannot help but impair their 
effectiveness. To return to an earlier example, if the government’s 
case turns critically on the informant’s testimony regarding meetings 
with known terrorists in which the [lawful permanent resident] 
allegedly participated, dogged cross-examination can try to expose 
internal inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony. But it seems 
nearly impossible for counsel to develop and present detailed 
countertestimony without tipping his client as to the crucial dates at 
issue—which could then compromise the secret information and 
thus violate the terms of counsel’s role.139 
In the end, although Professor Martin describes the ATRC as “a 
good-faith congressional effort to provide as many substitute 
safeguards as possible while still shielding . . . confidential 
information,”140 he argues that the court’s proceedings as applied to 
lawful, permanent residents would be unconstitutional.141 
As these scholars demonstrate, although no court has squarely 
addressed whether the government may constitutionally use secret 
evidence to find a resident alien deportable, it is possible to gain 
insight through arguments by analogy. 
 
groups within his hierarchy that enjoy the greatest constitutional protections—he assesses the 
court’s constitutionality as applied against lawful, permanent residents. Id. at 134. 
 139. Id. at 136. 
 140. Id. at 135. 
 141. See id. at 136 (“The ATRC is an impressive effort at substitute safeguards, but as 
applied to [lawful permanent residents], it is just not good enough.”). All but one of the scholars 
who have examined the ATRC’s constitutionality argue that its procedures violate a resident 
alien’s right to procedural due process. Compare id. (arguing that the ATRC is 
unconstitutional), with Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28–30 (arguing that the ATRC is 
constitutional). Perhaps importantly, Scaperlanda analyzed an early version of the bill creating 
the ATRC that would have required the government ultimately to meet a burden of clear and 
convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. See id. at 28 (“[T]he order of 
deportability will only issue on a finding that the Attorney General met her burden by clear and 
convincing evidence.”). 
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III.  REASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY  
OF THE ATRC’S SECRET-EVIDENCE PROVISIONS 
A. Reassessing the ATRC’s Constitutionality 
This Note’s analysis begins where other commentators’ analyses 
end. Like the previous analysis, this Part analyzes the ATRC’s 
constitutionality under the Mathews test. It does not, however, 
belabor the direction in which each factor leans: Resident aliens, 
whether permanent and whether lawful, possess an interest against 
being deported from the United States.142 Using secret evidence poses 
a risk of deporting a resident alien erroneously.143 The government 
possesses an interest in preventing the disclosure of sensitive 
information and in preventing domestic acts of terrorism.144 
Instead, this Part focuses on each factor’s magnitude. Because 
the Mathews test is a balancing test, the magnitude of each factor is 
just as important as its direction. Evaluating the magnitude of each 
factor shows that although aliens who possess different legal statuses 
enjoy different levels of constitutional protection, the ATRC risks a 
successful as-applied challenge from unlawful residents or legal 
temporary residents because the court provides them with weaker 
procedural protections than it provides legal permanent aliens.145 The 
ATRC also risks a successful as-applied challenge insofar as it allows 
deportation proceedings to continue without providing an alien with a 
special attorney to review secret evidence on the alien’s behalf.146 
Exposing the ATRC to these constitutional uncertainties is 
unnecessary because the government’s interest in deporting a 
suspected alien terrorist presumably is just as great when the alien is 
an illegal or legal temporary resident as it is when the alien happens 
to enjoy the legal, permanent resident status.147 
1. Reassessing the Magnitude of a Resident Alien’s Interest 
Against Being Deported.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, a 
lawful, permanent resident possesses a strong interest against being 
 
 142. See supra notes 82, 98–100, 107, 120, 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 83, 102–08, 121–22, 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 84–86, 101, 109–10, 123, 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 145. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 146. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 147. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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deported.148 As discussed in Part II, however, the interest of an 
unlawful or temporary resident is less clear-cut. The federal judiciary 
has adjudicated only one case, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee v. Reno, involving a temporary resident’s rights against the 
government’s use of secret evidence in an immigration proceeding.149 
Without commenting why, though perhaps because the aliens who 
brought the challenge were facing pending deportation proceedings, 
the court equated the aliens’ right to a change in status with their 
right to remain in their homes.150 Because each resident alien had 
resided in the country for over a decade, the court described this 
interest as “strong.”151 To support this statement, the court cited a 
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a lawful, permanent resident 
alien;152 the court, however, stopped short of directly equating the 
strength of temporary residents’ right to remain in their homes with 
the strength of the corresponding right of permanent residents.153 The 
court ultimately held that, because of the strength of the aliens’ right 
to remain in their homes, the government could not use secret 
evidence in the temporary residents’ change-of-status 
determinations.154 
As American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee suggests, 
unlawful or temporary residents may need to substantiate the 
strength of their interests against being deported, whereas a court will 
presume the strength of this interest for lawful, permanent residents. 
Resident aliens thus should not be treated as a homogenous group 
when assessing the ATRC’s constitutionality; aliens’ “sliding scale” of 
constitutional protection survives.155 An unlawful or temporary 
 
 148. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to 
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional 
status changes accordingly.”). 
 149. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated 
on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 150. See id. at 1068–69 (“Aliens who have resided for more than a decade in this country, 
even those whose status is now unlawful because of technical visa violations, have a strong 
liberty interest in remaining in their homes.”). 
 151. Id. at 1068–69. 
 152. Id. (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 34 (holding that a lawful, permanent resident who leaves 
the country for a short time is entitled to due process if the government denies reentry)). 
 153. See id. at 1069 (accepting the premise only that “the ‘equities’ of long residence in the 
country are relevant to legalization” (citing Firestone v. Howerton, 671 F.2d 317, 321 n.10 
(1982))). 
 154. Id. at 1070. 
 155. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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resident alien, however, might in some situations be able to prove an 
interest against deportation similar in magnitude to that of a lawful, 
permanent resident.156 In such a situation, a court might hold ATRC 
proceedings to be unconstitutional as applied against an unlawful or 
temporary resident alien. 
2. Reassessing the Risk of Error.  As courts and commentators 
have made clear, allowing the government to rely on secret evidence 
in deportation proceedings increases the risk of error. Relying on 
secret evidence, however, might increase the risk of error differently 
in differing circumstances. The magnitude by which secret evidence 
increases the risk of error depends on at least three factors: whether 
the resident alien receives a summary of the government’s secret 
evidence; the extent to which that summary accurately and precisely 
describes the evidence; and, in circumstances in which the 
government cannot provide a summary of secret evidence, whether 
the resident alien receives a special attorney to observe and cross-
examine the actual evidence on the alien’s behalf. 
The reason that secret evidence risks error is simple: because the 
resident alien may not observe the evidence, the alien cannot test its 
veracity.157 As commentators have discussed, providing a resident 
alien with an unclassified summary of the evidence abates this 
concern, at least to the extent that the summary accurately and 
precisely describes the actual evidence.158 Unfortunately, it is 
unrealistic to expect the government’s summary to be accurate and 
precise. To the extent such a summary were accurate and precise, it 
would run the risk of tipping off a resident alien to the government’s 
actual confidential information as well as to that information’s source. 
For the summary procedure to have been invoked, an Article III 
judge already would have ruled that alerting the resident alien to this 
information “would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the 
 
 156. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 49 (“Lacking cross-examination, aliens may face 
biases or inaccurate evidence without the chance to expose these weaknesses to the fact 
finder.”). Jackson also argues that secret evidence produces a risk of erroneous deportation 
because it “disables aliens from explaining the substance and context of the evidence to the fact 
finder.” Id. A special attorney would be able both to cross-examine the evidence and to explain 
its substance and context on behalf of the alien to the fact finder. 
 158. See, e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that such a summary “enhances—
albeit imperfectly—the ability of the alien to defend herself”). 
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national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.”159 
The U.S. attorney general also already would have demonstrated 
probable cause to believe that the resident alien is a terrorist.160 Under 
these circumstances, the attorney general and the judge would share a 
strong incentive to err on the side of providing the alien with an 
unclassified summary that is inaccurate or imprecise.161 It is therefore 
unrealistic to expect that an unclassified summary of the 
government’s secret evidence will do much to reduce the risk of error. 
Even assuming that the government’s unclassified summary 
would be accurate and precise, substituting the summary for actual 
evidence still would pose constitutional problems because it would 
increase the risk of erroneous deportation. Resident aliens receiving 
such a summary would still not be able to observe or cross-examine 
the actual evidence against them.162 No matter how well this 
unclassified summary were to describe the evidence, the aliens would 
only imperfectly learn the nature of the actual evidence against them. 
The aliens thus would be only imperfectly able to challenge its 
veracity and to build a defense. To the extent that the resident aliens’ 
ability to challenge the veracity of evidence against them and to plan 
a defense grows weaker, the risk of erroneous deprivation—and the 
risk of a successful as-applied constitutional challenge—
correspondingly grows stronger.163 
In some circumstances, providing an unclassified summary of 
secret evidence might jeopardize national security. In these 
circumstances, the statute allows the government to conduct ATRC 
 
 159. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (2006). 
 160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 161. Congress has followed the same impulse. Although the ATRC requires an unclassified 
summary to be “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense,” an early version of the bill 
ultimately creating the ATRC would have given this standard more teeth; it would have 
required such a summary “to provide the alien with substantially the same ability to make his 
defense as would disclosure of the classified information.” Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 150 & 
n.40 (quoting S. 735, 104th Cong., § 503(e)(6)(B) (1995), as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S7857, 
S7862 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)). Congress thus considered, but shied away from, a standard that 
would have required the government’s unclassified summary to more closely track its actual 
secret evidence. 
 162. Cf. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 418 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that being “denied the 
opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine one person . . . unconstitutional damages [a party’s] 
due process right to confront his accusers”). 
 163. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings without providing such a summary.164 If the resident alien 
before the ATRC enjoys the status of lawful and permanent resident, 
the alien may request a special attorney to observe and cross-examine 
the actual secret evidence on his behalf.165 Exercising this option 
lessens the risk of erroneous deportation enough, this Note argues, to 
shield ATRC proceedings from successful as-applied procedural due 
process challenges. 
Here, this Note parts ways with Professor Martin, who worries 
that a special attorney’s duty not to disclose the government’s secret 
evidence might cause the attorney to be ineffective.166 The attorney 
would need to protect against tipping off the alien to the 
government’s secret evidence, Professor Martin argues, limiting the 
attorney not only in what to tell the alien, but also in what to ask. Due 
to these limitations, he concludes the special attorney might not be 
able to prepare an adequate defense. 
Professor Martin’s concern is valid, but not fatal to the special 
attorney’s effectiveness. It is true that a special attorney might need 
to formulate questions carefully to the resident alien to avoid tipping 
off the alien to confidential information. Unlike the attorney general 
and unlike the ATRC’s presiding judge, however, a resident alien’s 
special attorney would owe the alien a fiduciary duty.167 Thus, the 
special attorney alone could be trusted to formulate questions to the 
alien with the alien’s best interests in mind.168 To the extent that 
formulating questions too cautiously might curtail the attorney’s 
effectiveness, the attorney therefore could be trusted to minimize any 
adverse effect.169 A forward-looking attorney also could circumvent 
 
 164. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 167. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (“A lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence . . . in representing a client.”); id. cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”). 
 168. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 169. A special attorney would have reason to be cautious in phrasing questions so as to 
avoid leaking information to the resident alien: “[a] special attorney receiving classified 
information . . . who discloses such information [to the alien] shall be subject to a fine . . . 
imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 25 years, or both.” 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii)(II) (2006). Still, as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct, a 
lawyer should “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s 
cause or endeavor.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007). The special 
attorney’s obligation thus helps to ameliorate the danger that fear of criminal prosecution would 
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any potential problem by comprehensively interviewing the alien 
before reviewing the government’s secret evidence. To be sure, 
conducting such an interview would be cumbersome; without 
knowing the specific events against which the attorney would need to 
defend the alien, the special attorney would be well advised to elicit 
all information that could possibly be relevant. Once apprised of this 
information, however, the special attorney would be in a position to 
represent the alien effectively after observing and cross-examining 
the government’s secret evidence. The attorney would be sufficiently 
able to prepare a defense; the only remaining question would be 
whether the attorney’s ability to observe and cross-examine the secret 
evidence sufficiently reduces the risk of erroneous deportation. 
The answer to this question is yes. To a special attorney, the 
evidence is not secret; the attorney possesses a security clearance 
allowing access to classified material.170 The resident alien enjoys an 
attorney-client relationship with that attorney; the special attorney is 
under a fiduciary duty to act in the alien’s best interests.171 Although 
the resident alien does not view the secret evidence personally, for 
the purposes of cross-examining the evidence the alien may fairly be 
said to view it constructively through the eyes of the special 
attorney.172 Thus, in this situation, the ATRC’s secret-evidence 
provisions pass constitutional muster. 
The secret-evidence provisions might not pass constitutional 
muster, however, in circumstances when an unlawful or temporary 
resident alien receives no summary of evidence. In that situation, the 
resident alien receives no special attorney to review the evidence.173 
Accordingly, the alien faces the same risk of error as Boyd and 
Rafeedie. Just as in Jay v. Boyd and Rafeedie, the resident alien might 
prevail in a due process claim. 
 
cause the attorney to tiptoe too softly when questioning the alien, which might detract from the 
effectiveness of representation. 
 170. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
 172. Allowing an attorney to review confidential evidence on behalf of a client is a common 
enough practice that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the situation. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 7 (2007) (“Rules or court orders governing 
litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. 
Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.”). 
 173. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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3. Reassessing the Magnitude of the Government’s Interest.  As 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Rafeedie, and 
Kiareldeen counsel, the government may not voice its interest in using 
secret evidence in abstract terms.174 Rather, its relevant interest must 
be specific and fact based—the extent to which that particular 
resident alien would endanger national security if left at large within 
U.S. borders or the extent to which disclosing the government’s 
particular sensitive information about the alien would prejudice 
national security or put any individual at substantial risk of harm.175 
When gauging the constitutionality of ATRC proceedings 
against a particular individual, the totality of the government’s 
interactions with that individual conceivably could cut in either 
direction. As in Rafeedie and Kiareldeen, the government may 
undermine its argument that the resident alien is dangerous by 
treating the alien outside of the proceedings as though not 
dangerous.176 Conversely, it is conceivable that the government could 
strengthen its argument that the resident alien is a terrorist by 
treating the alien cautiously in all interactions. 
The government might argue that the applicability of American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and Kiareldeen to ATRC 
proceedings is questionable. For ATRC proceedings even to 
commence, the U.S. attorney general must prove to the ATRC judge 
that the government possesses, at a minimum, probable cause to 
believe that the resident alien in question is a terrorist.177 Probable 
cause is not an inconsequential standard, and nothing in American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee or Kiareldeen suggests that the 
government’s level of suspicion approached that standard in those 
cases. In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the 
government alleged broadly that the resident aliens in question were 
connected to a terrorist organization.178 It did not allege any 
wrongdoing or plans of wrongdoing by either resident alien. In 
Kiareldeen, the government’s information against the resident alien 
 
 174. See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 
1995), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that a “broad generalization 
regarding a distant foreign policy concern and a related national security threat” was not 
adequate to justify the “use of undisclosed information”). 
 175. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 84–86, 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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consisted of one piece of uncorroborated hearsay, and Kiareldeen 
believed the source of the information was a person who had 
instigated his arrest on false charges six times.179 To the extent that 
neither factual situation reaches probable cause, American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee and Kiareldeen would seem 
inapposite to a challenge against the ATRC. Because the government 
must possess probable cause to use the ATRC, its interest in 
deporting a resident alien successfully brought before that court 
might be stronger than its corresponding interest in either American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee or Kiareldeen. 
Weighing in the final balance, a resident alien’s interest in 
remaining in the United States can be strong no matter what legal 
status the resident alien enjoys.180 The risk of erroneous deprivation 
posed by secret evidence varies, depending on whether the resident 
alien receives a summary of the secret evidence, the extent to which 
that summary accurately and precisely describes the evidence, and—
in circumstances in which the government cannot provide a summary 
of secret evidence—whether the resident alien receives a special 
attorney to observe and cross-examine the actual evidence on the 
alien’s behalf.181 The government’s interest in deporting a resident 
alien who the attorney general reasonably suspects to be a terrorist is 
strong—perhaps stronger than the government’s interest to deport 
the aliens at issue in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 
and Kiareldeen. Because of the variation in the magnitude of each 
interest, it is conceivable that the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions 
might be unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances. For 
ATRC proceedings to be constitutional in all situations, a few of the 
court’s statutory provisions must be amended. 
B. Remedying the ATRC’s Constitutional Deficiencies 
1. Treat Unlawful and Temporary Resident Aliens the Same as 
Lawful, Permanent Resident Aliens.  The government’s interest in 
detaining or deporting a terrorist who is unlawfully residing, or 
lawfully but temporarily residing, in the United States is presumably 
equal to the government’s interest in detaining or deporting a 
 
 179. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413, 416–17 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds sub. nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 180. See supra notes 148, 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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terrorist who happens to enjoy the status of a lawful, permanent 
resident.182 Because the constitutional interests of an unlawful or 
temporary resident alien may in some cases rival those of a lawful, 
permanent resident,183 Congress should eliminate the statutory 
provisions in the ATRC’s framework that distinguish between the 
groups. Otherwise, Congress risks having ATRC proceedings against 
temporary resident or unlawful resident alien terrorists invalidated as 
unconstitutional.184 
2. Appoint a Special Attorney in Every ATRC Proceeding, and 
Allow the Attorney to Review the Government’s Secret Evidence.  The 
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions run the greatest risk of violating a 
resident alien’s constitutional rights when the government uses secret 
evidence without appointing a special attorney.185 In such a situation, 
even if the alien were to receive an unclassified summary of the 
government’s secret evidence, the alien would be able to challenge 
the veracity of the evidence only imperfectly.186 Appointing a special 
attorney to each resident alien who comes before the ATRC would 
allay this constitutional concern because each resident alien could 
review and challenge the government’s secret evidence constructively 
through a special attorney.187 
Appointing a special attorney in every ATRC proceeding would 
burden the government. Short of banning secret evidence, however, 
allowing a special attorney to observe and cross-examine secret 
evidence is the surest way to eliminate the risk that using such 
evidence would cause an erroneous deportation. To the government’s 
benefit, appointing special counsel in all ATRC proceedings would 
ensure that the U.S. attorney general could prosecute a deportation 
proceeding against an individual who the attorney general has 
probable cause to believe is a terrorist without needing to publicly 
disclose a state secret. Without such changes, however, the ATRC 
risks being held unconstitutional. 
 
 182. Cf., e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069–70 (9th 
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (drawing no line between temporary 
and permanent residents when considering the government’s interest in deportation). 
 183. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 185. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 186. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 161, 165 and accompanying text. 
 187. For a discussion of this, see supra Part III.A.2. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ATRC’s statutory framework has several constitutional 
deficiencies. The court’s framework, however, which allows for the 
use of secret evidence, does not need a significant overhaul to remedy 
these concerns. For the use of secret evidence during ATRC 
proceedings to become constitutional in all cases, the ATRC’s 
statutory framework must guarantee temporary resident aliens and 
unlawful resident aliens the same protections it provides legal, 
permanent resident aliens; and the ATRC’s framework must either 
stipulate that every resident alien receive a special attorney who can 
review and cross-examine the government’s secret evidence or else 
ban the use of such evidence. 
These two suggestions for reform are not meant to exhaust what 
the government could, or even should, do to improve ATRC 
proceedings.188 Rather, they are meant to describe only what the 
government must do, at a minimum, for the ATRC’s statutory 
framework allowing for the use of secret evidence to comply in all 
circumstances with resident aliens’ constitutional right to procedural 
due process. The ATRC cannot ensure compliance in all 
circumstances with resident aliens’ constitutional right to procedural 
due process unless it does two things: provide illegal resident aliens 
and legal, temporary resident aliens with the same procedural 
protections that it provides legal, permanent resident aliens; and 
appoint a special attorney to every alien who comes before the court 
to review secret evidence on the alien’s behalf. Without these 
changes, the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions could be found 
unconstitutional. 
 
 188. Several calls for reform deserve discussion. Lawrence Harkenrider, for example, 
recommends raising the government’s burden of proof to deport a resident alien from a mere 
preponderance to clear and convincing evidence. Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 166. Jennifer 
Beall suggests that the ATRC’s framework should be amended to foreclose the use of evidence 
that is illegally obtained. See Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (“[D]eport[ation] based on illegally 
obtained . . . evidence . . . violat[es] a fundamental element of due process, the right to 
confrontation.”). 
